Tag Archive for: Mary Holloway Richard

Published: July 24, 2015

By Mary Holloway Richard

Q: Sunday is the 25th anniversary of the signing of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). What animals are currently considered to be service animals?

A: The definition of “service animal” comes from the ADA and includes animals individually trained to perform tasks for individuals with disabilities. As of 2011, Titles II (state and local government services) and III (public accommodations and commercial facilities) of the ADA recognize only dogs as service animals, although there’s a separate provision about mini-horses. In addition to service dogs, there are sensory or social signal dogs, psychiatric service dogs and seizure response dogs.

Q: Is there a difference between a “service animal” and a “therapy animal?” 

A: Service dogs are trained to perform tasks or to do work for people with disabilities such as guiding the blind, alerting the deaf, pulling a wheelchair, reminding a person with a mental health diagnosis to take medications, or protecting a person who is having a seizure. The work must be directly related to the person’s disability. Therapy animals provide supports and comfort to people in many different types of situations.  There seems to be an impression among some members of the public that the service designation includes untrained animals providing comfort to owners of varying degrees of independence. It is generally true that a mental health provider may provide a letter indicating that a “regular” pet provides emotional support as needed by the owner who has a mental health condition or disability, and special training is not required. An  important distinction is that these are working animals and not pets. In my representation of hospitals over the years, I’ve been asked to advise concerning requests for visitation by a broad array of animals including burros, boutique cattle, and cats to serve specifically as therapy or emotional support animals. Some of the relevant case law from other jurisdictions involves monkeys and one involves a sugar glider, an Australian
opossum-like creature.

Q: Do these rules apply just to hospitals or do they also apply to other types of facilities and providers of health services?

A: The guidelines for service animals also apply to surgery centers, dental clinics, assisted living and long-term care facilities, and urgent care and outpatient clinics. The federal requirement is to allow service animals to accompany persons with disabilities in all areas of a facility or office where the public is normally allowed to go. It’s my experience that hospitals are better prepared than these other sites listed and physician offices to respond to these requests. Hospitals generally have policies and procedures that mirror state and federal laws and industry best practices.

Q: Are there limits to these ADA requirements?

A: When service dogs raise valid concerns about patient safety and quality of care, all providers in their distinct care settings will find it necessary to balance patient, staff, employee and public safety interests. Common valid concerns for institutional and non-institutional providers include infection control, allergies, animal control, safety of others, disruption of care or ability to safely provide quality services. An example of such a concern is a situation where a service dog’s presence is desired in a health care setting but there’s no one to provide the necessary care for the service dog. I also have encountered service animals with open wounds or otherwise in need of veterinary care that posed risks to patient care and to personnel that had to be considered. Another issue that has arisen is a service dog trained to be protective in a manner that impedes care by staff, such as a dog trained to place itself between the patient and others.

By Mary Holloway Richard, JD, MPH

An Illinois appellate court recently upheld a trial court decision granting summary judgment in favor of a hospital in a case where the plaintiff sought to limit a hospital’s statutory peer review immunity.1 Upholding a stringent standard imposed by the trial court, the appeals court ruled that the Illinois peer review statute requires pleading and proof of actual or deliberate intent to harm, or clear indifference to or disregard for, the peer-reviewed physician, along with resulting physical harm to the physician, and that mere harm to reputation is not enough. In this case, OB/GYN Dr. Valfer alleged merely that Evanston Northwest Healthcare (ENH) had failed to follow the proper procedures in dealing with him and that this failure had caused him reputational harm. The appeals court held that this fell short of the showing required to overcome the state law peer review immunity.

Valfer’s medical staff privileges at ENH were renewed in November 2000 for one year and for an additional nine months in September 2001. He re-applied for privileges and was informed that issues had arisen requiring a review of his surgical procedures for the preceding 12 months. In June 2002, Valfer agreed to stop scheduling surgeries at ENH, and his operating privileges were suspended pending resolution of patient safety issues involving unnecessary procedures. Valfer was notified by the service chief that he would not recommend Valfer’s reappointment. In July 2002, the medical executive committee agreed with that recommendation and provided Valfer with written notice of its decision not to reappoint him and also notified him of his hearing rights.

In 2004, an ad hoc hearing was held in which the service chief and another competing physician testified against Valfer. The decision not to appoint was upheld. Valfer appealed the decision to the appellate review committees; the ad hoc committee’s decision was upheld and was affirmed by the Board. Valfer continued to admit patients until the decision not to reappoint became final in March 2005. During the three-year period from Valfer’s final application for reappointment to the effective date of non-reappointment, no changes were made in ENH credentialing software, and he continued to be listed in “good standing” and to admit patients.

In 2007, Valfer sued for civil damages resulting from ENH’s decision not to reappoint him. ENH filed a summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss the breach of contract claim. ENH argued there was no breach as ENH had followed relevant procedures and was immune under both the state statute2 and the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA).3 The summary judgment motion was granted.

On appeal, Valfer argued that there was, in effect, a reappointment by virtue of his continuing patient admissions and that this raised a question of fact as to ENH’s allegedly improper reliance on reappointment, rather than peer review, procedures. Valfer also characterized HCQIA immunity as limited to peer review and therefore not applicable because of ENH’s alleged reliance upon reappointment, rather than peer review, procedures. He argued that there was no peer immunity because of its willful or wanton denial of his privileges because of peer review by competitors. ENH responded in part that immunity under the Illinois peer review statute applied by virtue of the “willful or wanton” language and in the face of Valfer’s failure to allege physical harm to himself from the decision not to reappoint, and that the four statutory requirements for HCQIA immunity had been met.

In upholding the lower court’s decision the appellate court focused on legislative intent and the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. By giving effect to all statutory language, the court concluded that Illinois statutory immunity exists in the absence of willful or wanton misconduct. The plaintiff’s allegations of breach of contract by ENH for failure to follow the proper bylaws did not satisfy the statutory requirement of willful or wanton misconduct. The court cited precedent for overriding peer review immunity for civil damages where a defendant’s course of action demonstrates actual or deliberate intent to harm others or clear indifference to or disregard for a person and concluded that physical harm must necessarily be alleged and proved in order for a party to be civilly liable for peer review activities.4 According to the court, to require anything less, such as allowing damage to business or reputation to suffice, would make the peer review immunity meaningless and discourage such activities.

While parties often focus on HCQIA as the primary source of peer review immunity, this case illustrates that hospital counsel should not overlook the robust and vital protections that often co-exist under companion state law peer review privileges.


1 Valfer v. Evanston Northwest Healthcare, No. 1-14-2284, IL App (1st) 2015.
2 Ill. Hospital Licensing Act 210 ILCS 85/1 et seq (West 2012).
3 42 U.S.C. 11101 (2012).
4 Valfer at par. 29 citing Larsen v. Provena Hospitals, 2015, IL App (4th) 140255.

On Thursday, June 25, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in King et al. v. Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. .[i]  The decision came the week before many of the nation’s foremost health care attorneys met in Washington, D.C. to share information, meet with regulators and network in the interests of their clients.  As you might imagine there was significant discussion about the impact of the decision both in the contexts of formal presentations and hallway conversations.

The decision in this case was considered by some attorneys and commentators to hold the key to the future of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).[ii]   In the King case the ACA’s premium tax credits, as applied to federally financed plans, were challenged.  The premium tax credits worked to reduce the premium amounts for nearly 90% of all persons who have purchased health insurance through the state health insurance marketplace, known as a “health insurance exchange,” which provides consumers the opportunity to compare prices and plans.

The Supreme Court’s 6-3 decision held that the premium tax credits at issue would continue to be available in the dozen or so state-sponsored exchanges as well as in the more than thirty states with federally sponsored exchanges operated by the federal government.  The Court applied familiar theories of statutory interpretation to interpret the both the meaning of the statute and the intent of Congress to make premium tax credits available to individuals enrolled in insurance plans through both state- and federally-operated exchanges.  The Court chose not to defer the interpretation to the federal agency responsible for enforcing the tax credit, the Internal Revenue Service.  This is significant because it effectively forecloses the opportunity for any future administration to alter the interpretation to restrict the premium tax credits to the state-operated exchanges.

The challengers to the ACA language argued that, read literally, the specific ACA language at issue limits premium tax credits to state-operated exchanges only.  Justice Scalia’s twenty-one page dissent was described as scathing by many of us who made presentations at AHLA last week.  Justice Scalia wrote that “[w]ords no longer have meaning if an Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established by the State.’”[iii]  He also wrote in his dissent, “Perhaps sensing the dismal failure of its efforts to show that ’established by the State’ means ‘established by the State or the Federal Government,’ the Court tries to palm off the pertinent statutory phrase as ‘inartful drafting.’ This Court, however, has no free-floating power to ‘rescue Congress from its drafting errors.’”[iv]

Oklahoma is the site of a federal marketplace where, had the decision come down for the challengers, more than 87,000 persons would have been at risk for losing tax credits, and the state was at risk of losing over $18,000.00 in revenue, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation.[v]  The average tax credit per Oklahoma enrollee is $209.00, and, without the tax credit, there would have been an estimated 243% increase in the average premium.

At least while President Obama is still in office, the Court’s decision in King v. Burwell means that the threats to the ACA will mostly disappear.  The national uninsurance rate is likely to continue to fall because the ACA incentives—the ACA requires individuals to buy health insurance or face a penalty on their taxes and helps them afford health insurance through the premium tax credits. Fewer uninsured presumably also means health care providers will have less uncompensated care.

In the nation and in Oklahoma, we will continue, at least during this administration, generally to see a decreasing uninsured population and less uncompensated care for providers.  However, all of this is in the context of complex, increased regulation such as the proposed regulations for both Medicare and Medicaid that were indirectly and directly respectively spawned by the ACA.  The King decision, so long-awaited, appears to have deflated the opponents to the ACA for the time being.  The Court’s decision also means that the next Presidential and congressional elections may be critical to the fate of the ACA as changes now would only be placed in motion by Congress.



[i]
 576 U.S. ____  (2015), No. 14-114, slip op (June 25, 2015).

[ii] The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §18001 et seq. (2010).

[iii] 567 U.S. at ___-___ (principal opinion) (slip op. dissent, at 2.

[iv] Id. at 17.

[v] Kff.org/interactive/king-v-burwell-effects/

By Mary Holloway Richard, Attorney

shutterstock_healthcareWellness is in the news again.  Large employers have inserted wellness protocols and metrics into the workplace with great enthusiasm.  Advertisements for webinars tout the importance of clinicians and counsel getting on the wellness bandwagon, and articles on the topic appear daily in local and national newspapers.

The wellness debate continues and focuses on these issues:

  1. Financial impact
  2. High risk diseases and conditions subject to detection and prevention such as diabetes, hypertension, obesity and smoking
  3. Impact of economic status on health and ability to access to programs supporting lifestyle change (e.g., no time to attend a course or to exercise.

The Equal Employee Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is the federal agency charged with oversight of employer compliance with the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) and specifically with guiding employers in properly complying with the ADA in the context of popular wellness programs.  The ADA is, of course, statutory; supporting regulations and interpretive guidelines are issued by the agency.  While the interpretive guidelines do not have the force of law, they are regularly instructive as a window into the agency’s perspective and intent in terms of review and enforcement

Recently, the EEOC proposed a rule change in which it will reverse its own policy on whether or not employer-sponsored wellness programs discriminate against employees.  The EEOC is now saying that such programs do not necessarily discriminate against workers. The agency also indicates that such employers have yet to show the financial benefits of such programs. The EEOC’s proposed rule change would allow for employers to decrease premiums as an incentive for employees to comply with recommended health screenings and to improve their health metrics without violating federal disabilities laws.

Presented in late April, 2015, the EEOC’s  proposed wellness regulations seek to establish how such a program must be structured in order to comply with the ADA’s rule permitting disability-related inquiries and medical exams by a “voluntary health program.”[i]  The proposed regulations require:

  • A cap on an employer-incentive or penalty at 30% of the total cost of employee-only coverage under the plan. [ii] Total cost refers to employer plus employee contributions.
  • Additional requirements for employers offering a wellness program in conjunction with a group health plan, including notice to employees of the medical information to be obtained and by whom and how the information will be used and how safeguards against improper disclosure.
  • New confidentiality provisions to be applied to information obtained in wellness programs by sponsors or wellness vendor.
  • The program itself must be created in such a way as to promote health status, prevent disease and not be overly burdensome on plan participants.

This does not relieve the employers from compliance with HITECH and HIPAA and the Affordable Care Act.  In addition and importantly, employers will be faced with differing requirements by the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor and the Department of Health and Human Service — the agencies responsible for implementing the Affordable Care Act. These inconsistencies may be resolved at the close of the public comment period for these new EEOC proposed regulations. The period for public comment closes on June 19, 2015.


[i] It is likely that most wellness programs will fit into this category.

[ii] The Affordable Care Act’s non-tobacco incentive is held to the same limit for wellness programs including collection of health data.  The additional cap in the proposed regulations is for the same amount for the tobacco incentive for participation-only wellness programs unless the employer does not fall within the purview of the ADA (less than 50 employees.)  The policy ramification is that the EEOC does not distinguish between a tobacco-cessation wellness program where the participants are questioned about their tobacco use from one where a nicotine test is required of them to verify tobacco use or non-use.


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Author: Mary Holloway Richard is recognized as one of pioneers in healthcare law in Oklahoma. She has represented institutional and non-institutional providers of health services, as well as patients and their families. She also has significant experience in representing providers in regulatory matters.

 

Mary Holloway Richard, Of Counsel to Phillips Murrah’s Healthcare Practice Group, has been appointed Vice Chair of the American Health Lawyers Association’s Behavioral Health Task Force.

AHLA-logo-bigRichard was formerly a co-chair of the Providers and Clinicians Committee of the Behavioral Health Task Force.

She has represented both institutional and non-institutional providers of health services, as well as patients and their families.  Her career has included work at hospitals, outpatient clinics, behavioral health facilities and rehabilitation facilities and clinics.

Richard will be participating in a panel discussion entitled “Hot Topics in Behavioral Health” at the AHLA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. in June, 2015.

The Behavior Health Task Force was established by the nationwide professional organization to provide education for attorneys about the legal issues that arise in the provision of services to behavioral health patients and to alcohol and drug treatment providers and patients.